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NOTES
DEFAMATION-A STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR "CONSTITUTIONAL
FACTS." Bose Corp. v. Consumer Union of United States, Inc., 104 S.
Ct. 1949 (1984).
A review and evaluation of the Bose 901 loudspeaker system was
published in the May 1970 issue of Consumer Reports. Bose Corpora-
tion, the company manufacturing the speaker, found that article so ob-
jectionable that it demanded a retraction. Denied that avenue of re-
course, the speaker manufacturer brought suit in the United States
District Court for the District of Massachusetts for product disparage-
ment. Of the numerous statements in the article that were contested,
Bose Corporation prevailed on a single phrase in one sentence that
characterized the sound as wandering "about the room." The district
court found this phrase was disparaging and held the statement was
false because it inaccurately described the lateral movement the re-
viewers heard. After determining that the plaintiff was a public figure,
the district court applied the New York Times Co. v. Sullivan' stan-
dard of actual malice. According to the district court's reasoning, the
reviewer's testimony that he believed the statement to be correct was
not credible, because, as an intelligent person, he could not possibly
have interpreted the phrase to signify anything other than its actual
meaning. The district court based a finding of actual malice on this
analysis, and held that Bose had sustained its burden of proof.2
The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed,
holding that its review was not limited by Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 52(a), 3 which applies a "clearly erroneous" standard of review to
findings of fact. The First Circuit proceeded to perform a de novo re-
view and found that actual knowledge of falsity or a reckless disregard
1. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
2. Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 508 F. Supp. 1249 (D. Mass. 1981), rev'd,
692 F.2d 189 (Ist Cir. 1982), affid, 104 S. Ct. 1949 (1984).
3. "In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an advisory jury, the court shall
find the facts specially . . . . Findings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and
due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge of the credibility of the
witnesses." FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a).
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of the truth had not been shown by clear and convincing evidence.4 The
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether
the court of appeals should have applied the clearly erroneous standard
to the district court's finding of actual malice. The Supreme Court af-
firmed the decision of the First Circuit, and ruled that both the stan-
dard of independent review and that of Rule 52(a) must be followed,
and that Rule 52(a) did not proscribe an independent review. Ac-
cepting the district court's actual findings of fact, the Supreme Court
held that the discredited testimony did not in itself constitute clear and
convincing evidence of actual malice. Bose Corp. v. Consumer Union of
United States, Inc., 104 S. Ct. 1949 (1984).
Bose is the Court's latest foray into the area of defamation. The
particular statement in that case was written, but defamation may in-
clude any communication, written or oral, that causes harm to a per-
son's reputation.' Slander was originally the oral form of defamation,
while libel was printed or written.0 Historically, the ecclesiastical court
of England had jurisdiction over slander actions, resulting in a carry-
over requirement of proof of "temporal" damages7 when the common-
law courts assumed control in the sixteenth century. 8 This requirement
that there be earthly damages before a non-religious court could have
jurisdiction accounts for the primary legal distinction between slander
and libel; with certain limited exceptions, 9 libel is actionable without
pleading or proof of actual damage suffered, but slander is not.10
Libel, unlike slander, had its origins in criminal actions by the
Star Chamber to suppress seditious publications." Criminal libel was
4. Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of the U.S., Inc., 692 F.2d 189 (1st Cir. 1982), affd, 104
S. Ct. 1949 (1984).
5. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 559 (1938).
6. This distinction has become somewhat blurred by modern forms of communication such as
radio and television, but is still generally applicable. See PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF
TORTS § 112, at 785-88 (W. Keeton 5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter cited as KEETON].
7. The damages proved had to be actual or "worldly" in order to usurp the authority of the
church-controlled ecclesiastical courts.
8. KEETON, supra note 6, § 111, at 772.
9. Libel per quod requires extrinsic facts to prove its defamatory nature and is treated like
slander in requiring proof of special damages. See Ellsworth v. Martindale-Hubbell Law Direc-
tory, Inc., 66 N.D. 578, 268 N.W. 400, 406 (1936). Libel or slander per se does not require proof
of special damages; recovery is permitted on a showing of general damages. It is recognized in
cases imputing crime, Fowler v. Aston, 78 Eng. Rep. 523 (K.B. 1592); loathsome disease, Davis v.
Taylor, 78 Eng. Rep. 887 (K.B. 1599); unchastity, Cooper v. Seaverns, 81 Kan. 267, 105 P. 509
(1909); and in cases defaming a person's competence or solvency in his trade or profession,
Lumby v. AlIday, 148 Eng. Rep. 1434 (Ex. 1831).
10. Thorley v. Lord Kerry, 128 Eng. Rep. 367 (C.P. 1812).
11. The court of the Star Chamber was an infamous court, made up of judges and privy
councillors, that grew out of the king's council. During Henry VIII's reign, it managed to enforce
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not subject to the defense of truth.1 2 When civil actions began to be
allowed, possibly to prevent duels, 13 truth was recognized as a defense
for libel actions, as it had been for slander." In 1641, when the Star
Chamber was abolished and libel joined slander in the common-law
courts, the defense was applied to both forms of defamation.' 5
The criminal history of libel may have been responsible for an ele-
ment of malicious intent that at one point was required to be pled and
proved in defamation actions.' 6 However, this malice, used in the com-
mon sense of ill will or spite, came to be implied by law from the inten-
tional publication of defamatory material. 7 By 1910, this requirement
was extended to a standard of strict liability, with the defendant held
liable regardless of whether there was any negligence on his part. 18
There remained a requirement of negligence or intent in the transmis-
sion of the communication to a third party, that is, publication, but the
statement could be accidentally defamatory without barring recovery.19
Once a plaintiff established a prima facie case of defamation by
proving publication of a statement of the type to damage reputation,2 0
the defendant could raise the defense of a privilege. If the defense was
qualified, it might be overcome upon a showing of malice.21 Among the
qualified privileges at common law was one for fair comment. It al-
lowed the defense in cases involving a critic's opinion that was allegedly
defamatory.22
the law when other courts were unable to do so. It took its support from the king's prerogative and
was not bound by the common law. Its methods lacked the safeguards for the individual's liberty
the common-law procedures provided. See 9 THE NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA
MICROPAEDIA 529 (H. Benton 15th ed. 1974); see also I A. HANSON, LIBEL AND RELATED TORTS
T 9, at 6 (1969).
12. -[l]t is immaterial with respect to the essence of libel, whether the matter of it be true or
false." 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *150.
13. KEETON. supra note 6, § I 11, at 772.
14. See W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 12.
15. A. HANSON, supra note 11, 7, at 4.
16. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 113, at 772 (4th ed. 1971).
17. Bromage v. Prosser, 107 Eng. Rep. 1051 (K.B. 1825).
18. E. Hulton & Jones, 1910 A.C. 20.
19. Cassidy v. Daily Mirror Newspapers, Ltd., 2 K.B. 331 (1929) (newspaper printed that
Mr. Cassidy was engaged, and Mrs. Cassidy sued for libel).
20. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 613 (1938).
21. The circumstances under which a qualified privilege arises are varied, but have included
attorney-client confidences and credit reports. See generally KEETON, supra note 5, § 115, at 824.
Absolute privileges also exist that are not subject to defeat upon a showing of actual malice. These
include the judge, jurors, witnesses, counsel and parties in a judicial proceeding, legislators and
certain executive officers, and where the plaintiff has given consent. See KEETON, supra note 6, §
114, at 815.
22. Cherry v. Des Moines Leader, 114 Iowa 289, 86 N.W. 323 (1901) (qualified privilege
1984]
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This common law was adopted by the United States and continued
to develop without complications attributable to privileges raised by the
first amendment2 3 until 1964.24 When the Bill of Rights was adopted in
1791, the meaning of that amendment as we now commonly under-
stand it had not been formulated.2 5 Freedom of speech and of the press
was probably included as a reaction to the history of repression of the
press. 26 At this time, the guarantee of freedom of the press was seen by
some as merely the Blackstonian idea of freedom from prior restraint.27
Under that view, there was a sound basis for the enactment of the Se-
dition Law of 1798,28 and the Federalists used that argument in de-
fending the Act during legislative debate. 29 The American sedition law
did attempt to defer to first amendment rights by permitting truth to
be an absolute defense.30 Even so, that law is now considered by some
to have been unconstitutional, despite never having been reviewed by
given a newspaper editor who published an article on the plaintiff's public stage performance).
23. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people
to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
24. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), discussed infra p. 746-47.
Prior to Sullivan, "libelous speech was long regarded as a form of personal assault, and it was
accordingly assumed that government could vindicate the individual's right to enjoyment of his
good name, no less than his bodily integrity, without running afoul of the Constitution." L. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-12, at 631 (1978).
25. J. SMITH. FREEDOM'S FETTERS: THE ALIEN AND SEDITION LAWS AND AMERICAN CIVIL
LIBERTIES 426 (1956).
26. A. HANSON, supra note 11, 1 9, at 9.
27. See J. SMITH, supra note 25 at 427. "The liberty of the press is indeed essential to the
nature of a free state; but this consists in laying no previous restraints upon publications, and not
in freedom from censure for criminal matter when published." 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
*151-52 (emphasis in original).
28. See J. SMITH, supra note 25 at 427. The Sedition Act, Ch. 74, § 2, 1 Stat. 596 (1798)
(expired) states, "That if any person shall write, print, utter or publish ... any false, scandalous
and malicious writing or writings against the government of the United States, or either house of
the Congress of the United States, or the President of the United States, with intent to defame
• ..or to bring them, or either of them, into contempt or disrepute; or to excite against them, or
either of them, the hatred of the good people of the United States, or to stir up sedition within the
United States or to excite any unlawful combination therein, for opposing or resisting any law of
the United States, or any act of the President of the United States, done in pursuance of such law,
...or to aid, encourage or abet any hostile designs of any foreign nation against the United
States, their people or government, then such person, being thereof convicted ...shall be pun-
ished by a fine not exceeding two thousand dollars, and by imprisonment not exceeding two
years."
29. J. SMITH, supra note 25 at x.
30. "'And be it further enacted and declared, that if any person shall be prosecuted under this
act, . . . it shall be lawful for the defendant .. .to give in evidence in his defense, the truth of
the matter contained in the publication charged as a libel." Sedition Act, Ch. 74 § 3, 1 Stat. 596,
596-97 (1798).
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the Supreme Court. 1
The first case the Supreme Court heard that questioned the consti-
tutionality of a libel law was Near v. Minnesota." In Near, the Minne-
sota Attorney General had attempted to enjoin publication of a periodi-
cal that had charged law enforcement officials with neglect of their
duties under a state statute that forbade printing of "malicious and
scandalous libels." The Court struck down the statute as a prior re-
straint on the press and reversed the appellant's conviction.33 Civil lia-
bility was left untouched by that decision. However, Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire,34 which involved a Jehovah's Witness who cursed a city
marshall in violation of a statute after being arrested for distributing
religious literature, did deal with civil defamation in dictum. There, the
Court affirmed the conviction, indicating that there were two levels of
speech, and that false statements, like libel, fell into an area that was
unworthy of first amendment protection. 5 Beauharnais v. Illinois36 re-
affirmed that idea, and extended it to include defamation of groups of
persons.37 Civil liability was to be left to the individual state's control,
with a forbiddance of prior restraint the only abridgment on their dis-
cretionary power."8
In 1964, it became apparent that the states' concern in enforcing
their libel laws was not the only interest to be considered. The Supreme
Court, as Professor Prosser put it, dropped "something of a bomb-
shell"39 when it held in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan0 that the first
amendment required that the defendant in a defamation case, brought
by a public official, be given a privilege.4 1 The idea of such a privilege
was not entirely new,'42 but the common-law doctrine of fair comment
did not generally extend to misstatements of fact,43 and injection by the
31. The Act expired in 1801 under its own terms. Sedition Act, Ch. 74 § 4, 1 Stat. 596, 597
(1798). See C. LAWHORNE. THE SUPREME COURT AND LIBEL 3 (1981). For another good discus-
sion, see also New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 276 (1964).
32. 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
33. Id. at 716-23.
34. 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
35. Id. at 571-72.
36. 343 U.S. 250 (1952) (statute prohibiting defamation of a class of citizens of any race,
color, creed, or religion was upheld).
37. Id. at 256-57. Beauharnais had distributed anti-Negro leaflets. Id. at 261-64.
38. Id. at 266.
39. W. PROSSER, supra note 15, § 118, at 819.
40. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
41. Id. at 282-83.
42. See Coleman v. MacLennan, 78 Kan. 711, 98 P. 281 (1908) (extended the doctrine of
fair comment to facts as well as opinions).
43. W. PROSSER, supra note 16, § 118, at 819-20. The doctrine may have also been altered
1984]
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Court of constitutional issues into defamation cases was unexpected.
This privilege, which the Court found necessary to protect "unin-
hibited, robust, and wide-open" debate of public issues,44 was held to
be qualified, despite spirited concurring opinions by Justices Black and
Goldberg, who were in favor of granting an absolute privilege.45 The
majority, however, rejected the traditional requirement of malice to
overcome the privilege. The burden of proof on the issue of falsity was
shifted to the plaintiff. Rather than defeating the privilege with proof
of malice in the sense of ill will or spite on the part of the defendant,
the plaintiff could only overcome the privilege by showing that the de-
fendant had actual knowledge of the falsity of the statement, or acted
in reckless disregard for the truth. The Court's term for this require-
ment was "actual malice."'4 6 In order to be certain that the principles
involved were constitutionally applied, the Court ruled that an appel-
late court dealing with the privilege should perform an independent re-
view of the evidence to determine whether the plaintiff's burden had
been met.47 Here, the Court remanded since no evidence had been sub-
mitted that showed that those in charge of publishing the defamation
might have had knowledge that the statements were false.4 8
Sullivan engendered much debate from the beginning, 49 and the
uncertainty over its application, and the confusion that surfaced anew
as each of its progeny appeared, has produced a steady stream of con-
troversy.50 Undaunted, the Court has maintained its conviction that a
somewhat by Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 292, n.30 (1964). There was an indication that opinion
might also be subject to defeasement if actual malice were shown. See KEETON, supra note 6, §
113A, at 813, and § 115, at 831.
44. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 270.
45. See Id. at 293 (Black, J., concurring) and at 297 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
46. Id. at 280. The elusiveness of this new concept caused Justice Black to advocate stronger
protection of the first amendment through an absolute privilege so that a more definite line might
be drawn. Id. at 293 (Black, J., concurring). Justice Goldberg also favored this approach because
he believed the public was entitled to a privilege equal to that the public official could invoke for
comments made in his official capacity. Id. at 297 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
47. Id. at 284-85.
48. Id. at 285-88.
49. Justice Black expressed a justified concern that actual malice would be an "elusive, ab-
stract concept, hard to prove and hard to disprove." Id. at 293 (Black, J., concurring).
50. See, e.g., Comment, Constitutional Law-Proof of Actual Malice Required in Libel Ac-
tion for Defamatory Falsehood Relating to Official Conduct, 16 SYRACUSE L. REV. 132 (1964);
Berney, Libel and the First Amendment-A New Constitutional Privilege, 51 VA. L. REV. 1
(1965); Comment, Libel of the Public Figure: An Unsettled Controversy, 12 ST. Louis U.L.J. 103
(1967); Note, The N.Y. Times Rule and Society's Interest in Providing a Redress for Defama-
tory Statements, 36 Gao. WASH. L. REV. 424 (1967); Comment, Constitutional
Law-Defamation Under the First Amendment-The Actual Malice Test and "Public Figures",
46 N.C.L. REv. 392 (1968); Comment, Further Limits on Libel Actions-Extension of the New
[Vol. 7:741
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balance must be struck between the individual's interest in redress for
injury to his reputation and protection of the guarantees of the first
amendment.
For the first ten years after Sullivan, the scales seemed to weigh
quite heavily in favor of freedom of the press. The first expansion of the
actual malice rule came in Garrison v. Louisiana.51 Garrison concerned
a district attorney who, in a press conference, made unflattering re-
marks about eight judges. The Supreme Court reversed his conviction,
stating that proof of actual malice was necessary to convict a defendant
in a criminal libel case who had criticized a public official. The Court
held that the privilege was applicable to any statement that might
touch on the public official's fitness for office.52 Government employees,
even those in minor supervisory positions, were brought under the pub-
lic official rubric by Rosenblatt v. Baer.53 In Rosenblatt, the Court ap-
plied the actual malice standard to an action by the supervisor of a
county-owned recreational facility.
In 1967, further expansion of Sullivan was heralded by a case
based on right to privacy rather than defamation. In Time, Inc. v.
Hill,54 Life magazine had published an account of a play that depicted
a family's ordeal when held hostage by escaped convicts. The magazine
described the play as a re-enactment of an incident involving the Hill
family. Hill sued, basing his action on a New York statute that neither
mentioned right to privacy, nor allowed truth as a defense, although it
had been interpreted as including both by the New York courts.5  The
Supreme Court held that the statute could not be applied unless the
York Times Rule to Libels Arising from the Discussion of "Public Issues", 16 VILL. L. REV. 955
(1971); Libel-Constitutional Privilege-Why Not an Absolute Privilege?-Rosenbloom Doc-
trine in Washington, 7 GONz. L. REV. 344 (1972); Comment, Losing the Struggle to Define the
Proper Balance Between the Law of Defamation and the First Amendment-Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc.: One Step Forward, Two Steps Back, 2 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 383 (1975); Comment,
Libel Law: A Confused and Meandering State of Affairs, 6 CuM. L. REv. 667 (1976); Comment,
Persistence of Illogic: Further Constitutional Aspects of the Law of Defamation, 5 HOESTRA L.
REV. 635 (1977); Lewis, N.Y. Times v. Sullivan Reconsidered: Time to Return to "The Central
Meaning of the First Amendment", 83 COLUM. L. REV. 603 (1983); Von Baur, The License to
Defame Government Officials; N.Y. Times v. Sullivan Should Be Overruled, 30 FED. B. NEws &
J. 501 (1983).
51. 379 U.S. 64 (1964).
52. Id. at 77.
53. 383 U.S. 75 (1966).
54. 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
55. Id. at 376-78. "A person, firm or corporation that uses for advertising purposes, or for the
purposes of trade, the name, portrait or picture of any living person without having first obtained
the written consent of such person, or if a minor, of his or her parent or guardian, is guilty of a
misdemeanor." N.Y. Civ. Rights Law § 50 (McKinney 1976). See also Hill, 385 U.S. at 381-84.
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actual malice standard was followed. 6 The cause of action was inva-
sion of privacy rather than libel in Hill, but the Court still chose to
require actual malice in a suit brought by a private individual who had
not voluntarily thrust himself into the public eye. 57 The original reason-
ing in Sullivan had focused on the freedom of the governed to criticize
those in power,6 8 but Hill was more concerned with allowing free exer-
cise of first amendment rights by the press for the benefit of society. 9
Soon after Hill, the Court again expanded the categories of plain-
tiffs which would have to show actual malice to recover in Curtis Pub-
lishing Co. v. Butts and Associated Press v. Walker.60 The single deci-
sion for the two cases, however, did not result in a majority opinion,
and the new ground broken by the plurality did not receive complete
support. Butts concerned an article published in the Saturday Evening
Post that accused the University of Georgia football coach of leaking
information to Alabama's Paul "Bear" Bryant.61 In the other case,
Walker was a former army officer who contested an account of his role
in a riot on the campus of the University of Mississippi.62 Justice
Harlan's opinion extended the Sullivan rule to "public figures," but
applied a negligence standard to defeat the privilege rather than the
actual malice test. The plaintiff could prevail upon proof of "highly
unreasonable conduct constituting an extreme departure from the stan-
dards of investigation and reporting ordinarily adhered to by responsi-
ble publishers."" Only three other justices agreed with Justice Harlan
that a fault standard was proper.64
This discord was absent less than a year later when the Court de-
livered its opinion in Saint Amant v. Thompson.6" Here, in a suit
brought by a Louisiana deputy sheriff against a political candidate over
a statement read from an interview transcript during a televised speech,
the Court presented its clearest definition of reckless disregard. The
opinion by Justice White rejected any theory that negligence was an
element in that category of actual malice. "[R]eckless conduct is not
measured by whether a reasonably prudent man would have published,
56. Hill, 385 U.S. at 390.
57. Id. at 378.
58. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 282.
59. Hill, 385 U.S. at 389.
60. 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
61. Id. at 135.
62. Id. at 140.
63. Id. at 155.
64. Justices Clark, Stewart, and Fortas concurred in Harlan's opinion. Id. at 163.
65. 390 U.S. 727 (1968).
748 [Vol. 7:741
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or would have investigated before publishing." 6 Instead, the Court
adopted a subjective test dependent on the mens rea of the defendant.
The evidence had to support a finding that "the defendant in fact en-
tertained serious doubts as to the truth of his publication.""7
In Saint Amant, the Court had recognized a problem inherent in
that test; it would place a "premium on ignorance." ''" Nevertheless, the
Court adhered to the standard in 1971, in Time, Inc. v. Pape.69 The
issue in Pape revolved around the omission of the word "alleged" from
an article describing incidents of police brutality. The article quoted
from a summary of a complaint contained in a Civil Rights Commis-
sion report. The article presented the charges, but did not indicate that
they had been made by a plaintiff in a suit against Pape. Pape claimed
this gave the false impression that the charges were findings made by
the Commission. ° Application of the subjective test was particularly
difficult because what was reported was what a third party, the Com-
mission, said rather than did. The Court considered that the defendant
interpreted a document "[bristling] with ambiguities."7 In the major-
ity opinion, Justice Stewart was disturbed over allowing the jury to
make findings of fact concerning the defendant's state of mind. Such a
subjective determination would put the defendant "at the mercy of [the
jury's] unguided discretion.172 Unless there was evidence that the
meaning of the document was distorted, the question should not be sub-
mitted to the jury.78 Errors in judgement, such as omission of the word
"alleged," were found to be within the first and fourteenth amend-
ments' protection. 7" The Court cautioned, however, that its holding on
reckless disregard was to be narrowly confined to the facts of the
case.
7 5
Disharmony among the justices returned when the Court again at-
tempted to expand Sullivan in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.76 For
the first time since Time, Inc. v. Hill,7 7 the Court had to deal with a
private individual as plaintiff in a defamation action. Rosenbloom was
66. Id. at 731.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. 401 U.S. 279 (1971).
70. Id. at 282.
71. Id. at 291.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 290.
74. Id. at 292.
75. id.
76. 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
77. 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
1984]
UALR LAW JOURNAL
a magazine distributor involved in a dispute over obscenity charges
stemming from his trade. The defendant's news broadcasts included
stories of his arrest on those charges.78 After balancing the individual's
interest in protecting his reputation against the public's need to be in-
formed, Justice Brennan found that the plaintiff would have to show
actual malice in order to prevail.7 9 The difficulty of accurately deter-
mining the defendant's state of mind in cases like Pape may have
added to the unwillingness of some members of the Court to extend the
Sullivan rule any farther. In any event, only two justices joined with
Justice Brennan in the plurality. Of the other four opinions written,
three held this went too far in protecting the first amendment at the
expense of state libel laws.80 The dissenting opinions, representing the
views of three justices, argued that a fault standard should be applied
where private individuals are the plaintiffs."1
Those who felt that the rule in Sullivan should not be expanded
began to prevail, beginning with Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.8 1 There
was still no agreement on a single course of action, but Gertz was the
fountainhead of a line of cases favoring plaintiffs that would continue
over the next ten years.83
The plaintiff in Gertz was a lawyer who represented the family of
a murder victim in a civil action against a convicted murderer, a Chi-
cago policeman named Nuccio. The defendant's publication, American
Opinion, published an article implicating Gertz in an alleged frame-up
of Nuccio. 84 On appeal, a judgment notwithstanding the verdict in
favor of the defendant was affirmed, based on lack of evidence to sup-
port a finding of actual malice.85 The Supreme Court reversed, holding
that the Sullivan standard did not apply to private individuals, and
that the states were free to formulate their own rules, provided that
liability was not imposed without fault nor recovery allowed of punitive
or presumed damages without a showing of actual malice.8 To this
extent, Rosenbloom8" was overruled.
78. Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 32-35.
79. Id. at 52.
80. Id. at 58 (White, J., concurring).
81. Id. at 62 (Harlan, J., dissenting) and 78 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
82. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
83. See Abrams, Tort Law: The Supreme Court Turns a New Page in Libel, A.B.A. J. Aug.
1984, at 89.
84. Gertz, 418 U.S. 325-26.
85. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 471 F.2d 801 (7th Cir. 1972).
86. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 347-49.
87. 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
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The Court continued to chip away at earlier decisions expanding
Sullivan in Time, Inc. v. Firestone." Here, the plaintiff had been mar-
ried to the scion of a wealthy industrial family, and had become em-
broiled in a rather messy divorce proceeding. Time printed an item that
inaccurately stated the grounds for the divorce. Mrs. Firestone's jury
verdict was affirmed by the Florida Supreme Court.89 The United
States Supreme Court refused to recognize the plaintiff as a public fig-
ure because she had not thrust herself into a "public controversy."9 A
divorce could not be a public controversy, according to the Court, since
the plaintiff was compelled to go to court to obtain dissolution of her
marriage. 91 Apparently, the basis for determining whether a public
controversy exists depends on the extent to which the plaintiff has acted
voluntarily to attract public attention. The Court also rejected another
argument by Time that the Sullivan privilege should be extended to all
reports of judicial proceedings,92 and it remanded for compliance with
Gertz.98
The next blow to libel defendants was struck in 1979 by Herbert v.
Lando.94 Herbert was a retired army officer, whose accusations of war-
time coverup operations by his superiors were the subject of a CBS
report produced and edited by Lando. Herbert sued Lando, Mike Wal-
lace, CBS, and Atlantic Monthly, which printed a related article by
Lando, alleging false portrayal.9 5 The United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit granted Lando an absolute privilege concerning
the editorial process and remanded the case.96 The Supreme Court did
not find any precedent for such a privilege97 and was unwilling to in-
crease the burden on the plaintiff trying to prove actual malice. 8 The
Court reversed, admitting, however, the possibility of a chilling effect
on free discussion during the editorial process." Now, in addition to
restricting the number of people to whom the Sullivan rule would ap-
88. 424 U.S. 448 (1976).
89. Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 305 So. 2d 172 (1974).
90. Firestone, 424 U.S. at 455.
91. Id. at 454.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. 441 U.S. 153 (1979).
95. Id. at 155-56.
96. Herbert v. Lando, 568 F.2d 974 (2d Cir. 1977).
97. Herbert, 441 U.S. at 169.
98. Id. at 170.
99. Id. at 171. For more on Herbert and its effect, compare Franklin, Reflections on Herbert
v. Lando, 31 STAN L. REV. 1035 (1979) with Note, Herbert v. Lando: The Supreme Court's
Infidelity to N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 13 U.C.D. L. REV. 374 (1980).
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ply, it appeared the Court wished to make certain that the privilege
remained qualified, not approaching the protection that would have
been provided by Justice Black's absolute privilege.
The next punch was delivered in Hutchinson v. Proxmire.0°
Hutchinson was a research director whose studies were funded by fed-
eral agencies, which became the recipients of Senator William
Proxmire's Golden Fleece award for wasteful government spending. 101
Hutchinson sued Proxmire for statements he made in press releases and
newsletters. The district court granted summary judgment for
Proxmire, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Cir-
cuit affirmed.10 2 The Supreme Court first found that the speech and
debate clause'03 did not protect the press releases and newsletters since
neither was essential to, or part of, the deliberation process of the Sen-
ate.104 Then the Court held that Hutchinson was not a public figure, in
spite of the public's general concern with federal spending, since the
issue had not focused on Hutchinson until after the award. 0 5 This is a
more strict application of the Sullivan holding than Rosenblatt,0
Butts,0 1 and Rosenbloom'°8 would have indicated. The Court also fa-
vored a narrower view of the granting of summary judgment than that
of the district court. 09
In addition to the restrictions the Court imposed in Lando and
Proxmire, the Court handed down two jurisdiction cases, prior to Bose,
that also greatly enhanced the plaintiffs odds. Keeton v. Hustler Mag-
azine, Inc.,- 0 and Calder v. Jones"' gave the plaintiff a wider choice
of forums." 2 In Calder the Supreme Court explictly declined special
100. 443 U.S. 111 (1979).
101. Id. at 114.
102. Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 579 F.2d 1027 (7th Cir. 1978).
103. "The Senators and Representatives shall ... in all Cases, except Treason, Felony and
Breach of the Peace, be privileged from Arrest during their Attendance at the Session of their
respective houses, and in going to and returning from the same; and for any Speech or Debate in
either House, they shall not be questioned in any other Place." U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 6, cl. 1.
104. Hutchinson, 443 U.S. at 130.
105. Id. at 135.
106. 383 U.S. 75 (1966).
107. 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
108. 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
109. Hutchinson, 443 U.S. at 120, n.9.
110. 104 S. Ct. 1473 (1984) (allowing suit in a forum with which the plaintiff had little
contact).
11I. 104 S. Ct. 1482 (1984) (the intentional act of writing the article at issue was sufficient
contact with the state to allow jurisdiction over the defendant).
112. Keeton overturned a finding that jurisdiction would violate due process since the single
publication rule would allow recovery in a state with a longer statute of limitations for injuries
incurred in other states where suit was barred. The single publication rule provides that for each
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procedural protection for defendants in libel cases.113 Rejecting the
lower court's concern over the chilling effect the decision might have on
first amendment activities, the Court considered the substantive safe-
guards adequate."'
The Court's hard line on procedural help for libel defendants ap-
peared to soften a bit in Bose.15 While Justice Stevens, writing for the
majority, observed that Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure and its clearly erroneous standard must be followed, so too, must
the Sullivan rule of independent review on the issue of actual malice." 6
The Court found that the conflict was "more apparent than real" ' 7
and that Rule 52(a) did not proscribe an examination of the entire
record. Indeed, previous decisions had required an examination of the
record to determine whether the findings of fact were clearly errone-
ous.1 8 Here, since the rule of independent review had already been
applied in cases originating in federal courts, application of a different
standard to cases that arose in a state court "would pervert the concept
of federalism." 19
In addition to the clearly erroneous standard, Rule 52(a) requires
that "due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to
judge of the credibility of the witnesses. 11 9 A The Supreme Court be-
lieved this indicates that "the presumption of correctness that attaches
to factual findings is stronger in some cases than in others."' 20 To de-
termine how strong the presumption was in this case, the Court decided
that it was particularly important that the reviewing judges who per-
form an independent review under the Sullivan rule had "a constitu-
publication, only one action can be brought, but that action will allow recovery for damages suf-
fered in all other jurisdictions on the same cause of action, and will bar any other action between
the same parties on that cause of action in another jurisdiction. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF
TORTS § 577A(4) (1977). Under the Supreme Court's holding, magazines with national distribu-
tion are subject to suit in whichever jurisdiction most favors the plaintiff, since the magazine
continuously exploits state markets and should be able to anticipate being brought into suit in
those states. Keeton, 104 S. Ct. at 1481.
113. Calder, 104 S. Ct. at 1488.
114. Id.
115. 104 S. Ct. 1949 (1984).
116. Id. at 1959.
117. Id.
118. Id. The Court cited United States v. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364 (1948) (involving a
conspiracy to restrain trade). "A finding is 'clearly erroneous' when although there is evidence to
support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction
that a mistake has been committed." Gypsum, 333 U.S. at 395.
119. Bose, 104 S. Ct. at 1959.
I 19A. Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a).
120. Bose, 104 S. Ct. at 1959.
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tional responsibility that cannot be delegated to the trier of fact. 1 21
The majority noted that "Rule 52(a) does not inhibit an appellate
court's power to correct errors of law, including those that may infect a
so-called mixed finding of law and fact, or a finding of fact that is
predicated on a misunderstanding of the governing rule of law."1 2 The
Court looked at three characteristics of the Sullivan rule to determine
whether the issue of actual malice should be treated as one of fact or
law: (1) the common law heritage of the rule, (2) the necessity of case-
by-case adjudication to define the rule, and (3) the constitutional val-
ues that were protected, making it imperative that judges oversee the
rule's correct application. 2 a
The Court examined the first characteristic, the common law heri-
tage, and found that historically judges were given maximum leeway to
determine motivation in related cases such as early actions for deceit.
"Moreover, the exercise of this power is the process through which the
rule itself evolves and its integrity is maintained.""24 The judge-made
law was found necessary to define this type of rule.
The case-by-case adjudication was considered particularly appro-
priate where the standard to be set out is from the Constitution. "This
process has been vitally important in cases involving restrictions on the
freedom of speech protected by the First Amendment, particularly in
those cases in which it is contended that the communication in issue is
within one of the few classes of 'unprotected' speech. 125 The Court
looked at these other areas of unprotected speech, and found "judicial
evaluation of special facts . . . deemed to have constitutional signifi-
cance."1 26 Justice Stevens cited cases from the areas of "fighting
words," obscenity, and child pornography in which the Court had
shown a willingness to examine what were essentially questions of fact.
The line dividing the unprotected and protected areas was so important
that the examination was required, in each case, to prevent intrusions
into the constitutionally protected areas.
Other cases involving "constitutional fact" also required indepen-
dent review, "both to be sure that the speech in question actually falls
within the unprotected category and to confine the perimeters of any
unprotected category within acceptably narrow limits in an effort to
121. Id.
122. Id. at 1960.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 1960-61.
125. Id. at 1961.
126. Id. at 1962.
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ensure that protected expression will not be inhibited.' 7 The Court
did not feel that merely providing the triers of fact with a general
description of speech which was not protected would serve these pur-
poses, or "eliminate the danger that decisions by triers of fact may
inhibit the expression of protected ideas."' 28
Having satisfied itself that independent review of the actual malice
issue was necessary, the Court concluded that the appellate court
should be upheld. The First Circuit's determination that there was no
clear and convincing evidence of actual malice was in accord with the
Supreme Court's findings on review. Justice Stevens found that use of
the district court's analysis would mean that "any individual using a
malapropism might be liable, simply because an intelligent speaker
would have to know that the term was inaccurate in context; even
though he did not realize his folly at the time."' 29 Accepting "all of the
purely factual findings"'"0 made by the trial court, the Supreme Court
held, as a matter of law, that there was no actual malice.
Justice Rehnquist's dissent left clear his disenchantment with the
majority's elevation of the defendant's state of mind from a mere sub-
jective fact, to "something more than a fact-a so-called 'constitutional
fact.' '"'3 His position was that it was inappropriate for an appellate
court to make a finding of fact, such as the subjective finding on the
mens rea of an author. He reached this conclusion despite the special
significance the majority placed on such facts, in cases where a consti-
tutional right was at stake. According to Justice Rehnquist, the deter-
mination of reckless disregard would be better left to the factfinder. He
feared that the result of the holding would be "lessened confidence in
the judgments of lower courts and more entirely factbound appeals.'""
In addition, Justice Rehnquist was satisfied that the Sullivan rule "ad-
equately addresses the need to shield protected speech from the risk of
erroneous fact-finding by placing the burden of proving 'actual malice'
on the party seeking to penalize expression."'' 32A
Justice Rehnquist's concerns over the Court's acceptance of fact
finding duties are certainly justified. Looking at Bose in a broader
sense, the Supreme Court's eagerness to review facts is disturbing be-
cause it will add to the appellate courts' burden. The majority must
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 1966.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 1968 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
132. Id. at 1970.
132A. Id.
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have believed the result was worth the price, since it explicitly noted
that other means to the end were available. "It may well be that in this
case, the finding of the District Court on the actual malice question
could have been set aside under the clearly erroneous standard of
review."133
Perhaps the Court was attempting to reaffirm a concept that had
come under sharp criticism," 4 and had been repeatedly restricted by
recent decisions. 1 5 If the press could raise a hurrah over Bose, it might
not be quite as enthusiastic a cheer as some may have expected. Bose
was a decision that favored the defendants in libel cases by upholding
the rule of independent review, but anyone who anticipated that the
narrowed application of Sullivan in recent years might lead to an abso-
lute privilege will now have to put those hopes aside. Even though pro-
tection of the press would not be lessened by a lower standard, neither
will Justice Black's opinion be adopted by the Court.
Some may fear that the concept of actual malice could become
even more elusive if open to review at the appellate level, but a differ-
ent result in Bose would have been the death knell for the privilege.
Jurors seem quite willing to disregard the actual malice requirement
when they cannot understand it. While Bose does not set out to per-
fectly define reckless disregard, it does clarify the concept tremen-
dously. It is obvious that the Court does not consider it to be a modified
version of the negligence standard applied in Gertz. While Gertz cast a
shadow on the cases preceding it, the Court has removed the cloud, at
least insofar as it covered the definition of reckless disregard in Saint
Arnant. It should now be clear that actual doubt on the part of the
defendant is a necessary element in a finding of reckless disregard.
The pruning the Court performed on the rule's expansion may
have been necessary, and those cases that cut back on Sullivan's ex-
pansion will probably continue to be good law for some time. Certainly,
the Court has found it difficult to balance the conflicting requirements
of protection for both individual reputation and freedom of the press,
but Bose has shown that the core of Sullivan, and the guarantees of the
first amendment, are still a vital concern in the country's highest court.
Susan Stevens
133. Id. at 1967 (majority opinion).
134. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
135. See Gertz, 418 U.S. 323 (1974); Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976); Lando, 441 U.S. 153
(1979); Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111 (1979); Keeton, 104 S. Ct. 1473 (1984); and Calder, 104 S. Ct.
1482 (1984).
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